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reconciliation mobilizers . who are active at the 
level of communities. This dyna mism is a sign 
of ownership of the process of reconcilia tion by 
grassroots communities, of confidence and 
harmony which cha racterize henceforth the 
social relations among Rwandans: 72 o/o of the 
popula tion are of the opinion that the situation 
in the country has markedly improved . Fina lly. 
among other results there is room for · sha ring 
experiences with delegations and researchers 
from various countries, and the creation of a 
"Peace and Leadership Cen ter ··. 56 o/o of the 
Rwa ndan popula tion know very well activities 
carried out by NURC. 
Expe1iences gained by NURC have shown that 
establishing con fidence and healing the trauma 
are the central aspects in the process of recon-
ciliation. that the use of local culture was a 
determining factor. and that national unity and 
reconcilia tion concern various aspects of politi-
cal and socioeconomic life, from which it follows 
that there is a need to adopt a holistic approach 
to facing these imperatives. Finally. it is the 
s trong will and the determination of the 
Rwandans to get up to their feet again after the 
genocide which are at the origin of the progress 
achieved so far in the political, socia l and 
economic doma ins. 
NURC does not ignore the huge challenges 
which remain: the compensation fund for geno-
cide survivors. the living conditions of the lat-
ter. disclosing the truth in Gacaca jmisdictions 
and security of the victims and the witnesses, 
poverty and illiteracy, insecurity in the region 
and the obstinacy of the genocidal ideology. 
Nevertheless. NURC achievements are quite 
impressive. More particularly. it has managed 
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to popularize concepts and practices of unity 
and reconcilia tion at community level by 
creating tools and modem institutions based 
on integrative practices of Rwandan culture. In 
future. NURC should capitalize its successes by 
s trengthening the capacities of communities at 
all levels so that they could u ndertake and 
realize reconciliation programs on by 
themselves. 
THEME III: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 
Military Integration, disarmament and 
demobilisation. Military Integration in 
Rwanda, by Maj. Gen. Karenzi Karake 
History of military integration is as old as that 
of armed forces. Military integration is the 
result of the existence of segregation in armed 
forces or in society itself. It is an affirmative 
action which dissipates fear and frustration. 
guarantees individual and collective security 
and strengthens reconciliation and stability of a 
divided society. 
Pre-colonial Rwanda had an inclusive army. 
composed of Hutus. Tutsis and Twas. It had the 
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mandate to protect and to expand the national 
" 
territory. During the colonization era (1894-
1959). the army became a tool in the service of 
the colonial administration to dominate and 
exploit the colonized. In 1959 was born an 
army which was ethnically homogeneous whose 
mission was to protect the Hutu power. 
In 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 
launched a war of liberation against the govern-
ment of the National Revolutionary Movement 
for the Development (MRND) and its armed 
forces (ex-RAF) because the situation had 
reached an impasse. notably :he question of the 
refugees. When RAF and the ruling class saw 
their power in danger. they prepared and exe-
cuted the genocide against Tutsis in April, 
1994. 
The genocide was stopped by the RPF army in . 
July, 1994. All social and economic infrastruc-
tures had been destroyed and nothing was 
functioning. International aid organizations 
had followed the mass of refugees in the neigh-
boring countries. There the international aid 
passed under the control of the genocidal forces 
who started to get organized, with the help of 
Zaire (current DRC) to attack Rwanda and to 
complete their genocidal proj'~ct. 
Inside the country. the government of the 
national unity deployed all efforts to recon-
struct infrastructures and to set up the recon-
.ciliation process. The Rwandan Patriotic Army 
(RPA). now the Rwandan Defense Forces ( RDF), 
played a central role in that recovery process. 
Rwandans' inclusive spirit was a strategy prac-
ticed by RPA in its war of liberation: this was 
done in order to both weaken the enemy and 
realize RPF political program. In the post-geno-
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cide context, there were new developments due 
to the multiple challenges which the country 
had to face, notably the challenge to reconcile 
the imperatives of justice and reconciliation as 
well as to ensure sustainable peace. For that 
purpose, it was necessary to involve political 
forces which until then were competing for the 
government of national unity and to integrate 
ex-RFA combatants in a new national army. 
The classic models which RPA could have 
applied are integration by consent which is part 
of the package of wider negotiated agreements 
between two belligerent parties under the 
mediation of a third part. the complete 
demobilization of soldiers from the defeated 
opposition decided by the government in power 
and the coercive model which implies the 
disarmament of factions in conflict under the 
supervision of an external intervention (e.g. 
UNO). Rwanda did not follow any of these 
models. It looked for a model which addresses 
its particular situation: its recent history and 
that of its armed forces. 
The Rwandan model is based on consent: 
former combatants are integrated in conformity 
of Arusha Accords (1993): the Protocole III 
provides for integration of RPA into RAF. It is 
the opposite which occurred: ex-RF A were 
integrated into RPA. Contrary to the classic 
model. here integration was a continuous 
process which took place before. during and 
after the cease-fire. The traditional concept of 
ingando, solidarity camps, was taken over and 
used. Traditionally ingando refers to the 
gatherjng of troops before the attack in a place 
where they w~re given the last instructions and 
were re-organized. tasks and responsibilities 
were clearly specified. They were reminded that 
national interests were above individual 
interests. 
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The objective of the current ingando is to allow 
participants, soldiers or civilians. to go beyond 
,the feelings of fear and mutual suspicion and 
speak freely about. the conflict which opposes 
:them. to heal the wounds, to accept responsi-
bilities in case harm was done. to demystifY the 
negative perceptions of one towards the other, 
to assume collectively the consequences of the 
common tragedy and agree on the common 
future. Ingando is based on the approach of 
problem resolution, which encourages the 
participants to analyze their conflict. its causes, 
and attitudes of one towards the other and 
post-conflict relationships. 
Within the framework of military integration, 
this methodology comprises four phases. The 
first phase allows RDF soldiers and ex-combat-
ants to speak out about history and origin of 
the conflict. with the aim of removing barriers 
which prevented them from communicating. 
The second phase consists of appointing the 
former opponents to various posts. By working 
together they continue their discussions about 
the conflict and establish close relations. 
During the third stage, participants are 
encouraged to analyze the conflict as a common 
problem with shared losses and responsibili-
ties. This is done not to utter blames but to 
analyze the conflict so as to prevent it from 
occurring again in future. During the fourth 
stage. ex-combatants appraise all the process. 
Ingando is the beginning of the resolution of the 
conflict. The challenge is to always b capable of 
ensuring an atmosphere which allows mutual 
respect, recognition of dignity and humanity of 
each participant. 
Between 1995 and 2002. 49.700 
ex-combatants were integrated into RDF. while 
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the latter was demobilizing 27.340 soldiers 
This process has continued up to date. The 
country has received dividends from the 
security climate as a result of this policy of 
military integration. It has allowed to efficiently 
fight against uprising of infiltrated elements by 
cutting ex-RAF and militias from their supply 
base, since integrated soldiers had become 
citizens who wanted to protect their families. 
Besides. these soldiers, once demobilized. 
transformed themselves into actors of 
economic development and reconciliation. 
Military integration is an important element in 
the process of reconciliation and restoration of 
sustainable peace. The success depends on the 
political and military leadership will, on its 
insertion at grassroots level and its ownership 
by communities. International partners will 
back up local initiatives but the latter do not 
belong to them. Finally, in the perspective of 
reconciliation. ex-combatants should also be 
considered as "victims" of the conflict and 
consequently losers as well. 
The experience of military integration carried 
out by RDF produced a new example of an inte-
grated institution. It has allowed also to ensure 
security in _ the country and to propose a new 
model of the culture of unity and hope as 
opposed to the culture of hatred and despair. 
************* 
The demobilization process in Burundi, 
by Col. Isate NIYIBIZI 
A historical reminder of the major events which 
occurred before this process is necessary to 
understand the national program for demobi-
lization and reintegration (PNRR) in Burundi. 
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